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Female incumbents are of higher average quality than male incumbents; this quality
difference is the result of barriers to entry faced by potential female candidates.  However, the
observable effects of this quality difference are masked by the fact that female incumbents are
more likely to be opposed in primary or general elections and more likely to be opposed by high
quality challengers.  Correcting for this irrational tendency among challengers, we estimate that
the gender-based quality differential leads to an electoral advantage for female incumbents of
about six percentage points.  However, the gender bias on the part of challengers lowers the net
effect to about two percentage points. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) estimate that the office-specific benefits of incumbency
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translate into about 3.7 percentage points of the two-party vote for House elections in the the
1980's.
Gender Bias and Selection Bias in House Elections
Jeff Milyo and Samantha Schosberg
1.  Introduction
Contrary to popular opinion, recent research has shown that female candidates suffer no
electoral or fund-raising disadvantage compared to male candidates [Burrell, (1985 and 1994),
Darcy, Clark and Welch (1994), Gaddie and Bullock (1995) and Werner (1997)].  A gender
related fund-raising disadvantage may have existed in Congressional elections prior to the mid-
eighties, but this seems to have disappeared or even reversed in recent years (Flammers, 1997). 
Since 1984, female candidates for the House have been slightly more successful than males at
raising funds and at least as successful in raising PAC contributions, large contributions and even
early contributions (Burrell, 1994).  At the state level, female candidates also raise more money
than their male counterparts (Werner, 1997).  Consequently, the current dearth of female office
holders is thought to be primarily the result of prior barriers to women entering politics, the
effects of which are still realized today because of the generic incumbency advantage (Uhlaner and
Schlozman, 1986).   Similarly, the recent successes of female candidates for Congress are seen as
1
the natural consequence of turnover:  older and more male-dominated cohorts are being replaced
by younger and less male-dominated cohorts.  Consequently, the media-ballyhooed “Year of the2
Woman” in 1992 was not so much an indication of a sudden end to gender bias, but rather part of
a slow but persistent erosion of male domination in politics.
Of course, the absence of a fund-raising disadvantage does not imply that male and female
candidates are on equal footing.  Equivalent campaign spending may not produce equivalent
results.  It is possible that due to either voter bias or candidate inexperience, campaign spending
by female candidates is somehow less productive in swaying the electorate.  Several studies have
examined the impact of voter perceptions of candidates through surveys and experiments, but the
evidence that gender bias translates into an electoral disadvantage is at best mixed [e.g., Leeper
(1991), Kahn (1996) and Smith (1997)].  Further, Herrick (1996) uses data from the 1988
through 1992 House elections to test the proposition that the electoral effects of campaign
spending differ with the gender of the candidate.  She finds that campaign spending by female
challengers is less productive in terms of vote share, but that just the opposite is true for campaign
spending by female candidates for open seats.  Consequently, there is no consistent evidence of
voter bias against female candidates.
It is tempting to conclude that recent cohorts of female candidates face no (material) bias. 
In contrast, we argue that there remain strong prejudices that work to the disadvantage of female
candidates.  Previous work has assumed that the existence of a bias against women should be
evidenced in poorer performance, either in raising funds or in winning votes.  This would be true
if candidates were chosen by a random process from among a pool of “qualified” individuals.  We
would then expect to see voter bias or donor bias to be manifested in poorer electoral
performances by female candidates, since male and female candidates would be otherwise
comparable in their electoral prospects.  In addition, we would also observe that as the3
educational and work opportunities of women improved over time, the pool of qualified females
would expand and more women would both run for office and win election.  Over time, the
representation of women in office would approach their representation in the pool of qualified
potential candidates.  In this scenario, there is no important gender bias specific to the political
process, as evidenced by the comparable success of those few but increasing number of women
who “make the grade.”  Existing studies of female candidates seem to support this “no specific
bias” hypothesis.  However, the interpretation of existing evidence is called into doubt once we
consider the effect of barriers to entry in politics.
Suppose that there exists a barrier to entry for potential female candidates.  Initially
suppose that this barrier is the product of gender bias among voters,  potential campaign donors
or some combination.  The exact source of the bias is irrelevant except that it be specific to the
political process and separate from any additional socioeconomic bias that determines the size of
the pool of qualified candidates.  Further, suppose that the electoral success of a candidate
depends on that candidate’s “quality,” as well as the direct effects of any voter or donor bias.  If
potential candidates choose to run when their expected performance exceeds some threshold (for
now assume that the threshold is the same for men and women), then the average quality of
females candidates will be higher than that of male candidates.  This quality difference arises
because quality must compensate for the expected electoral effects of gender bias in order for a
female potential candidate to reach the threshold required to run for office.  If researchers are
unable to appropriately control for candidate quality then, this “cream of the crop” effect --- the
presence of relatively few but relatively high quality female candidates --- will serve to counter theSimilar “cream of the crop” effects have been observed in relative wages for women and
2
minorities, as well as in SAT scores.  For example, Blau and Beller (1988) find that increased
labor force participation by women has lead to a decrease in the female to male wage ratio (all
else constant);  this is the “cream of the crop” argument in reverse:  as gender barriers in
employment lessen, the quality (hence wage) of the average female worker also falls relative to
the average for male workers.
4
observed effects of voter or donor bias on candidate receipts and vote share.
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It is also possible that the candidate selection process is biased against women;  this would
raise the minimum quality threshold required for women to become candidates, exacerbating the
“cream of the crop” effect.  If this were the only gender bias present in the political process, then
we would expect that those few and high quality female candidates who run for office would raise
and spend more money and fare better in their election bids than their male counterparts. 
However, the additional presence of voter and\or donor bias against female candidates works in
the opposite direction.  This makes the effects of gender on the campaign finances and vote shares
of candidates ambiguous.  Consequently, the observation that female candidates suffer no net
fund-raising or electoral disadvantage is consistent with both the absence and presence of gender
bias.
Previous studies of the effects of gender in House elections have implicitly assumed that
the quality of candidates is either perfectly controlled or random.  However, it is difficult to
quantify candidate quality, so it is not possible to control completely for this factor.  Further, even
if we can control for incumbent quality, the presence and quality of challengers is not random. 
We address the first point by focusing on the experience of male and female incumbents, since 1) 
when comparing across incumbency status the effects of gender may be obscured (because
incumbency is such a dominant determinant of fund-raising and electoral success), and 2) more is5
known about incumbent quality (tenure, committee and leadership positions, etc.), which
mitigates the problem of unobserved heterogeneity among incumbents.  Initially, we address the
second point by controlling for the presence and observed quality of challengers.  We also model
and estimate the selection of challengers and the effects of this selection process on the fund-
raising and electoral success of female incumbents.
We show that if non-gender determinants of fund-raising and electoral success are
ignored, then female incumbents appear to run under-funded campaigns against well-heeled
challengers and consequently fare worse in terms of vote share than their male counterparts.  As
we control for other factors (including incumbent quality) these gender differences become
smaller.  However, once we control for the presence and quality of challengers, we find absolutely
no gender effect in the campaign finances of female incumbents or their challengers, but female
incumbents do enjoy a statistically significant electoral advantage (about two percentage points of
the vote).  Further, female incumbents are significantly more likely to face a challenger, a major
party challenger or a high quality challenger.  Once this bias in the presence and quality of
challengers is considered, the electoral advantage enjoyed by female incumbents rises to five or six
percentage points, or about twice the electoral advantage attributable to the benefits of holding
office in the House (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997).  This suggests that there does indeed exist
important unobserved individual heterogeneity among incumbents and that female incumbents are
of higher quality than male incumbents.  The fact that female incumbents are nevertheless more
likely to be opposed suggests that potential challengers systematically underestimate the quality of
female incumbents.  This contention is supported by the additional finding that once we control
for the selection of challengers, female incumbents still do not raise or spend more money, butBecause of the small number of female incumbents, we treat each instance of a female
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incumbent running for election as an independent observation.  This is not an uncommon
assumption in the literature on Congressional elections [e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996b);
however, also see Milyo (1998)].  As more women serve in the House, it will be both possible and
desirable to estimate individual fixed effects in addition to gender effects.
For a discussion of the difficulties and importance of measuring candidate quality, see
4
Levitt (1994) and Milyo (1998).
6
their challengers spend far less money than do challengers of male incumbents.  Apparently,
potential campaign donors are not as optimistic about defeating female incumbents as are their
challengers.  While we can not rule out the existence of gender bias among either or both voters
and campaign donors, our results do suggest that the most important effects of gender in House
elections are realized through the barriers to entry into politics for women and the irrational
tendency for challengers to overestimate their likely success against female incumbents.
2.  Data and Methods
We examine the electoral success of House incumbents for the period 1984 to 1992.  We
pool the data over these elections, since over this time period there are only 108 instances of
female incumbents running for reelection.   We focus on incumbents elected prior to 1992 (a.k.a.,
3
“Year of the Woman”) for two reasons.  First, the period chosen makes our results more
comparable to those found in previous studies (e.g., Burrell, 1994).  Second, we focus on
incumbents since it is easier to control for variations in candidate quality among incumbents.  
4
Future work should  explore whether the surprising findings reported here carry over to more
recent elections.  For example, as the socioeconomic barriers to entry in politics fall, do the
specific political barriers for women also fall?  If so, we would expect the average quality of7
female candidates to fall as more women enter politics.
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables employed in this study are reported in Tables
A1 in the appendix.  All campaign finance data are from the Federal Election Commission and are
adjusted for inflation (1990 = 100);  information on challenger quality is taken from the
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.  All other data is from the Almanac of American
Politics.
We assume the following structural model of incumbent vote share, incumbent campaign
finance and challenger campaign finance:
(1) (Incumbent Vote Share)  =   vs *(Incumbent Expenditures) i  1 I
  +  vs *(Challenger Expenditures)  +  X VS  +  u 2 i 1i 1i
(2) (Incumbent Receipts)  =  r *(Incumbent Vote Share)  +  X R  +  u i  1 i 2i 2i
(3) (Incumbent Carry Over)  =  s *(Incumbent Vote Share)  +  X CO  +  u i 1 i 3i 3i
(4) (Incumbent Expenditures)  =  (Incumbent Receipts)  -  (Incumbent Carry Over) i  i  i 
 +  (Incumbent Carry Over)-1,i
(5) (Challenger Expenditures)  =  (Challenger Receipts)  -  (Challenger Carry Over)   i  i  i 
+  (Challenger Carry Over)-1,i
(6) (Challenger Receipts)  =  cr *(Incumbent Vote Share)  +  X CR  +  u i 1 i 6i 6i8
(7) (Challenger Carry Over)  =  cs *(Incumbent Vote Share)  +  X CCO  +  u i 1 i 7i 7i
In the model above, the u’s are disturbance terms, the other terms in italics are structural
parameters and the subscript ranges from one to the number of incumbents running for reelection. 
The X’s are matrices of exogenous determinants of each structural equation.  “Carry Over” is the
savings or debt carried over to the next election, while “Carry Over ” is the same variable lagged -1
one election (it is the savings or debt carried over to the current election).  Finally, we assume for
the time being that the presence and quality of challengers is determined exogenously.  Later, we
will treat the presence and quality of challengers as endogenous variables.
Fortunately, we do not need to estimate the structural parameters of this model
(identification of the structural parameters of this kind of system of equations has been the
bugaboo of the literature on the electoral effects of campaign spending).  We are only interested
in the net effects of gender on the dependent variables of interest (Incumbent Vote Share,
Incumbent Receipts, Incumbent Expenditures, and Challenger Expenditures).  Consequently, we
estimate reduced form regressions of the following type:
(8) (Dependent Variable)  =  XDV + u i  i i
In this reduced form equation, X is composed of all of the exogenous variables that appear in the
other X#’s above and the parameter estimates (DV) are the net effects of each of these exogenous
factors on the dependent variable.  Consequently, regressions on each of the dependent variables
employ the same set of independent variables.Lagged vote share is sometimes used as a proxy for district partisanship, but see the
5
discussion below on lagged dependent variables.
Our results are not sensitive to the exact definitions of the “positions of influence”
6
variables.  The list of powerful committees mimics that in Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996b);  also
see Groseclose and Stewart (1998).
9
We take an agnostic approach to the exact specification of (8) and report regression
results for transformed (log or square root) and untransformed values of the dependent variables. 
Further, we employ four nested sets of independent variables.  The first includes only a constant
and a dummy indicator of gender (Female).  The second adds party and year (interacted) effects
as well as a measure of district level partisan affiliation.  Our district measure is the district vote
share for the presidential candidate of the incumbent’s party in the most recent election (vote
share is calculated using only the major party candidates).   In the third specification, we add
5
controls for tenure (tenure, tenure squared and a dummy for first term incumbents) and positions
of influence in the House.  The position controls are a dummy variable for leaders (the Speaker
and other party leaders, members of the Committee on Rules, and committee or subcommittee
chairs) and a dummy variable indicating membership on three of the more powerful House
committees (Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce).   The position
6
controls are also interacted by party.  The fourth specification includes several dummy indicators
for the presence of a primary challenger, the presence of any opponent in the general election, the
presence of a major party opponent and the presence of a “high quality challenger.”  We define
“high quality” as previous experience in elective office, service as a major party official, other
government service (Congressional staffer, judge, sheriff, etc.) or some local celebrity status
(professional athletes, television news anchors, etc.).  This measure of challenger quality isIt is well documented that experienced challengers fare better than political novices (e.g.
7
Jacobson, 1990).  For more detailed treatments of challenger quality, see especially Green and
Krasno (1988), Krasno and Green (1988), Levitt (1994), Squire (1995) and Ansolabehere and
Snyder (1996b).
Lagged endogenous variables can be useful as proxies for omitted and time-invariant
8
factors, so we have explored the impact of including Incumbent Carry Over ;  in short, our -1
findings are slightly more modest, but still consistent with the effects of gender reported below.
Several studies have examined the relationship between incumbent war chests and the
9
presence of challengers;  for evidence of the deterrent effects of war chests, see Sorauf (1988 and
1992), Squire (1989), Hersch and McDougall (1994), Goodliffe (1995) and Box-Steffensmeier
(1996).  However, see Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996a,b) and Milyo (1998) for evidence to the
contrary.
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admittedly simplistic, but it is common in the literature [e.g., Jacobson and Dimock (1994) and
Milyo (1997a,b)].   Further, this simple dichotomous measure becomes an advantage when we
7
treat the presence and quality of challengers as dependent variables of interest, since it permits us
to use a simple probit analysis.
Initially, we do not treat “Carry Over ” as an independent variable in the reduced form -1
estimation; as a lagged endogenous variable, “Carry Over ” is correlated with other time invariant -1
independent variables, like gender.  Because we are specifically interested in the net effects of
gender in elections, we do not include this variable as a control.   However, once we treat the
8
presence and quality of challengers as dependent variables, then in some specifications we include
“Incumbent Carry Over ” (as well as lagged vote share) as a determinant of opposition to the -1
incumbent.
9
   
3.  Incumbent Gender and Campaign Finance
In this section, we estimate various specifications of reduced-form regressions of11
incumbent campaign receipts and incumbent spending in House elections.  This exercise
demonstrates that the apparent campaign finance advantage enjoyed by female incumbents
disappears once non-gender determinants of campaign finances are considered.
First, we examine the campaign receipts of House incumbents.  The first column of Table
One shows that absent other controls, female incumbents raise about $50,000 more than male
incumbents (or 10% of the average receipts for an incumbent during this time period).  As
additional controls are added, this estimate becomes smaller, both in absolute terms and relative to
the standard error.  Once the controls for the presence and quality of challengers are added in (4),
the female effect on receipts completely disappears.  This same pattern is evidenced even more
dramatically in (5-8) where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of incumbent receipts. 
The estimated gender effect in (5) for an incumbent with average receipts is about $85,000 (close
to 20% of the average receipts for an incumbent during this time period), but this completely
disappears once controls are added for the presence and quality of challengers (in specification
(8).
The results in Table Two confirm the existence of similar magnitudes and patterns for
incumbent expenditures (1-4) and the natural logarithm of incumbent expenditures (5-8). 
Consequently, despite significant differences in mean campaign finances, ceteris paribus there is
no significant difference in the campaign finances of female and male incumbents.
A similar pattern emerges for challenger expenditures (Table Three).  However, this
dependent variable does present two additional complications: about 10% of the incumbents in
this time period are unopposed (n=197), and only those candidates spending more than $5,000 are
required to file campaign finance disclosure reports with the FEC  (a total of 289 challengers doWe have experimented with setting a different amount for non-reporting challengers but
10
this has little substantive affect on the results reported in Table Three.  Tobit estimates do
produce larger estimates of incumbent gender on challenger expenditures for specifications (1)-(3)
and (5)-(7), but do not affect the pattern across specifications and do not produce substantively
different estimates for gender in the specifications of most interest, (4) and (8).
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not meet the reporting threshold).  We have tried to account for these cases in several ways.  The
results we report treat the absence of a challenger as an instance of zero challenger spending,
while non-reporting challengers are assumed to have spent $2,500 (following Erickson and
Palfrey, 1993).   In Table Three, the previous pattern remains the same:  absent other controls,
10
female incumbents face higher spending challengers, but this difference disappears once the
presence and quality of challengers are included as controls.  The only statistically significant
effects are seen in the logarithmic specifications, where female incumbents face challengers who
spend almost $250,000 more than the average challenger’s spending during this time period (an
increase of almost 200%).  However, as above, this estimated gender effect completely disappears
once the presence and quality of challengers is added to the list of control variables.
4.  Incumbent Gender and Incumbent Vote Share
  The absence of a gender difference in campaign spending has inspired some attempts to
test whether campaign expenditures by female candidates are less productive than expenditures by
male candidates (e.g., Herrick, 1996).  However, we find that once other relevant factors are
taken into consideration, female incumbents have a significant electoral advantage over their male
counterparts.
As in most studies of Congressional elections, we measure electoral success by theDuring this time period, there are simply too few incumbents defeated to use that as a
11
measure of electoral success.  However, probit analysis of incumbent wins does not contradict the
findings presented here (the estimated gender effects have similar signs, but are not significant). 
As a dependent variable, vote share does have its drawbacks:  it has an upper  bound of one (197
incumbents are unopposed in the sample).  However, tobit estimates for vote share (and square
root of vote share) produce very similar estimates of the gender effect.
13
incumbent’s share of the vote received by the top two vote-getters.   The first column of Table
11
Four shows that absent other controls, female incumbents receive significantly less vote share (2.2
percentage points) than male incumbents.  As more controls are added in (2) and (3), this estimate
becomes smaller both in absolute terms and relative to the standard error.  Once the presence and
quality of challengers are included as independent variables, the female effect on vote share
becomes positive and significant (2 percentage points).  This is about half the size of recent Levitt
and Wolfram’s (1997) estimate of the office-specific portion of the incumbency advantage itself. 
Specifications (5-8) show this same pattern when the dependent variable is the square root of vote
share. 
The evidence presented up to this point demonstrates that the estimated effects of gender
in House elections can change dramatically depending on whether the presence and quality of
challengers are held constant.  Consequently, these variables merit further attention.
5.  Incumbent Gender and the Presence and Quality of Challengers
In Table Five, we present the results of probit analysis on each of three nested
dichotomous variables:  whether the incumbent is opposed, whether the incumbent is opposed by
a challenger who is endorsed by a major party, and whether the incumbent is opposed by a high
quality challenger (defined above).  We use the same nested set of independent variables, with oneWe conduct a similar analysis of primary opposition;   for specification (4), the gender
12
effect is twelve percentage points [(p |female)  -  (p |male) = .12] and is primary-opposent primary-opposent
statistically significant (p<.05);  this represents a 39% increase in the probability of being opposed
in the primary [(p |male)=.31]. primary-opposent
14
exception: our fourth specification now differs from the third in that we add the incumbent’s
lagged carry over (or the incumbent’s “war chest”) and the incumbent’s previous vote share as
determinants of the presence and quality of challengers.  For each of these specifications, gender
has a statistically significant influence on the presence and quality of challengers.  For example,
using the estimated coefficients in specification (4) and considering a male incumbent with the
average probability of being opposed in the general election [(p |male) =  .90], a change in opposed
gender raises this probability by seven percentage points [(p |female) -  (p |male) = .07], opposed opposed
which is an 8% increase in the baseline probability.  Similar calculations for the probability of
being opposed by a major party challenger or the probability of being opposed by a high quality
challenger produce changes of twelve and seven percentage points, respectively [(pmajor-
|female) -  (p |male) = .12 and (p |female) -  (p |male) = .07];  these party major-party high-quality high-quality
represent increases of 14% and 39% over the respective baseline probabilities.
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This gender related increase in the presence and quality of challengers suggests that the
electoral advantage of female incumbents is understated in the regression results reported in
Tables Three, above (since the presence and quality of challengers were treated as exogenous).   
Consequently, we now treat the presence and quality of challengers as endogenous variables.
6.  Gender Effects in a Sample Selection Model of House Elections
 Assume the following two-stage process: first, a high quality challenger chooses whetherAs before, in the non-linear specifications, the estimated (untransformed) gender effect is
13
calculated for a male incumbent with an average vote share or with average challenger
expenditures.
There are 17 high quality challengers that do not report any expenditures, as before, we
14
set challenger expenditures at $2,500 for these cases.
15
to run against an incumbent, then given that a high quality challenger runs we estimate the gender
effect on the other dependent variables of interest.  The first stage estimate that we use is identical
to specification (12) in Table Five (identification comes from the lagged Carry Over and lagged
Vote Share variables).  The second stage regression is run on the selected sample of only those
incumbents with high quality challengers (n=340);  we correct for the sample selection bias by
including the inverse mills ratio from the first stage as an independent variable
(Heckman, 19xx).  In Table Six we report the second stage estimated gender effect for the
campaign finances and vote share variables (transformed and untransformed).  Gender still has no
net effect on the finances of the incumbent in (1) - (4), but the effect on the other variables is
more pronounced than in previous estimates.  The selection corrected estimate of the electoral
advantage of female incumbents is six percentage points in both the linear (5) and square root
specifications (6);  p<.01 and p<.05, respectively.   This electoral advantage is about three times
13
as large as our previous estimate.  The selection corrected effect of gender on challenger
expenditures is also significant and about ten times larger than our previous estimate.  For both
the linear (7) and log (8) cases, the estimated incumbent gender effect is equal to about one-third
of the standard deviation in challenger expenditures; p<.05 and p<.10, respectively.
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Some caution is in order;   we have already stated that challenger quality is particularly
difficult to measure (indeed, that is part of our motivation for examining the gender ofThere are 231 major party challengers that do not report any expenditures, once again,
15
we set expenditures at $2,500 for these cases.
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incumbents).  Further, only 29 female incumbents face high quality challengers during the period
we examine.  So, as a check on these findings, we estimate a more conservative version of this
same two-stage model.  Rather than attempt to identify “high quality” challengers, we feign
ignorance on this point and simply distinguish between challengers who are endorsed by a major
party and those who are not (a more gross, but incontrovertible measure of challenger quality). 
Now the first stage estimate is identical to specification (8) in Table Five.  In the second stage, we
include only those incumbents with a major party challenger (n=1638) and as before, we correct
for sample selection bias.
The results of this exercise are found in Table Seven; our findings are very similar to those
reported in Table Six.  There is no gender effect on incumbent fiances, but there is a significant
gender effect on the incumbent’s vote share and the challenger’s expenditures.   While the
15
estimated effects are a bit more modest, this is to be expected since we have chosen to allow more
unobserved heterogeneity among challengers by ignoring our measure of high quality challengers.
7.  Conclusion
Potential challengers systematically underestimate the electoral strength of female
incumbents;  this gender bias is irrational in that those challengers fare worse in terms of vote
share than comparable challengers.  This is at least partly recognized by potential campaign
donors as the challengers of female incumbents raise and spend less money than comparable
challengers.  However, female incumbents do not raise or spend more money than male17
incumbents, despite the higher average quality (and vote share) of female incumbents.  This
suggests that female incumbents do realize some disadvantage in fund-raising.
The gender bias in the challenger selection process has gone unrecognized in the literature
on women in politics.  This selection bias is significant in its own right ( a 10 to 30% increase in
the probability of being opposed, opposed in a primary, opposed by a major party challenger or
opposed by a high quality challenger), but it is all the more important in that it confounds the
estimation of the gender effect on candidate vote shares and campaign finances.  By considering
the selection of challengers in House races, we have shown that the “cream of the crop” effect
causes female candidates to be of higher quality than males (as evidenced by the five to six
percentage point gender advantage in vote share).  Further, once this quality difference is
recognized, it is apparent that female incumbents suffer a disadvantage in fund-raising (as
evidenced by the lack of a gender effect on campaign receipts, despite the higher quality of female
incumbents).  However, to the extent that there exists additional gender bias among voters, our
findings understate the true electoral advantage attributable to the higher quality among female
incumbents.  Consequently, future work on gender and elections should take into consideration
the large quality difference between female and male candidates demonstrated by this study.
Bibliography
Ansolabehere, S. and J. Snyder (1996a).  “The Inter-Election Dynamics of Campaign Finance: 18
U.S. House Elections, 1980 to 1994,” presented at the 1996 meetings of the American Political
Science Association in San Francisco, CA.
Ansolabehere, S. and J. Snyder (1996b).  "Money, Elections, and Candidate Quality," presented at
the 1996 meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL.
Blau, F. and Beller, A. (1988).  “Trends in Earnings Differentials by Gender, 1971-1981,”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 41(4): 513-529.
Box-Steffenmeier, J.  (1996).  “A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of Campaign War Chests in
Campaign Strategy,” American Journal of Political Science, 40:352-371.
Burrell, B. (1985).  “Women’s and Men’s Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives,”
American Politics Quarterly, 13(3): 251-272.
Burrell, B. (1994).  A Woman’s Place is in the House.  University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor,
MI).
Darcy, R., S. Welch and J. Clark (1994).  Women, Elections and Representation.  University of
Nebraska Press (Lincoln, NB).
Erickson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey (1993).  “The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and
Incumbency in Congressional Elections,” mimeo, California Institute of Technology.
Flammers, Janet A. (1997).  Women’s Political Voice.  Temple University Press (Philadelphia,
PA).
Gaddie, R. and C. Bullock (1995).  “Congressional Elections and the Year of the Woman:
Structural and Elite Influences on Female Candidates,” Social Science Quarterly, 76(4): 749-762.
Goodliffe, J. (1995).  "War Chests and Challenger Quality," paper presented at the 1995 meetings
of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL.
Green, D. and J. Krasno (1988).  "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent:  Reestimating the
Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections," American Journal of Political Science,
32:884-907.
Groseclose, Tim and Charles Stewart (1998).  “The Value of Committee Seats in the House,
1947-1991,” American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, April, 1998.
Herrick, R. (1996).  “Is There a Gender Gap in the Value of Campaign Resources?” American
Politics Quarterly, 24(1): 68-80.19
Hersch, P. and G. McDougall (1994).  "Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in
Congressional Races," Economic Inquiry, 32:630-41.
Jacobson, G. (1990).  The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.  Westview Press (San
Francisco, CA).
Jacobson, G. and M. Dimock (1994).  "Checking Out:  The Effect of Bank Overdrafts on the
1992 House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, 38:601-624.
Kahn, K. (1996).  The Political Consequences of Being a Woman.  Columbia University Press
(New York, NY).
Krasno, J. and D. Green (1988).  "Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections," Journal
of Politics, 50(4):920-36.
Leeper. M. (1991).  “The Impact of Prejudice on Female Candidates,” American Politics
Quarterly, 19(2): 248-261.
Levitt, S. (1994).  "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effects of Campaign Spending on
Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), pp. 777-98.
Levitt, S.  And C. Wolfram (1996). “Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in the
U.S. House,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(1): 45-60.
Milyo, J. (1997a).  “The Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: GRH,
TRA86 and the Money Committees in the House,” Journal of Law and Economics, 60(1): 93-
112.
Milyo, J. (1997b).  “The Economics of Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very
Greedy Grandfathers,” Public Choice, 93: 245-270. 
Milyo, J. (1998).  The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending:  A Natural Experiment
Approach.  Citizens’ Research Foundation (Los Angeles, CA), forthcoming.
Squire, P. (1989).  "Competition and Uncontested Seats in U.S. House Elections," Legislative
Studies Quarterly 14:281-95.
Squire, P. (1995).  "Candidates, Money, and Votes," Political Research Quarterly 48(4):891-
917.
Smith, E.  (1997).  “The Role of Candidate Sex in Voter Decision-Making,” Politcal Psychology,
forthcoming.20
Uhlaner, C. and Schlozman, K. (1986).  “Candidate Gender and Campaign Receipts,” Journal of
Politics, 48: 30-50.
Werner, B. (1997).  “Financing the Campaigns of Women Candidates and Their Opponents:
Evidence from Three States, 1982-1990,” Women & Politics, 18(1): 81-97.
Table One:  Regression Estimates of Effects of Incumbent Gender on Incumbent Fund-Raising21
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992; n=1924)
Dependent Variable (1-4): (1) (2) (3) (4)
Receipts
Female 50,865* 42,902* 38,688 13,633
(n=108) (27,138) (25,627) (24,826) (24,518)
R .00 .08 .13 .19
2
Dependent Variable (5-8): (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(Receipts)
Female .163*** .149*** .120*** .068
(n=108) (.050) (.047) (.046) (.044)
R .00 .08 .16 .22
2
Party, Year and District No Yes Yes Yes
controls
Tenure and Position controls No No Yes Yes
Challenger controls No No No Yes
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Receipts are measured in real dollars (1990=100);  
all standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option in TSP).22
Table Two:  Regression Estimates of Effects of Incumbent Gender on Incumbent Spending
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992; n=1924)
Dependent Variable (1-4): (1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditures
Female 60,120** 44,865* 41,250 8,955
(n=108) (28,447) (26,339) (25,840) (25,204)
R .00 .12 .17 .25
2
Dependent Variable (5-8): (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(Expenditures)
Female .216*** .180*** .139** .059
(n=108) (.064) (.060) (.060) (.058)
R .00 .12 .19 .28
2
Party, Year and District No Yes Yes Yes
controls
Tenure and Position controls No No Yes Yes
Challenger controls No No No Yes
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Expenditures are measured in real dollars
(1990=100);  all standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option in TSP).23
Table Three: Regression Estimates of Effects of Incumbent Gender on Challenger Spending
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992;  n=1924)
Dependent Variable (1-4): (1) (2) (3) (4)
Challenger Expenditures
Female 29,139 27,828 11,616 -10,025
(n=108) (23,182) (22,223) (20,751) (21,265)
R .00 .10 .13 .23
2
Dependent Variable (5-8): (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(1 + Challenger
Expenditures)
Female 1.089*** .951*** .753*** -.051
(n=108) (.260) (.248) (.248) (.168)
R .00 .08 .09 .82
2
Party, Year and District No Yes Yes Yes
controls
Tenure and Position controls No No Yes Yes
Challenger controls No No No Yes
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Challenger Expenditures are measured in real
dollars (1990=100);  all standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option
in TSP).24
Table Four:  Regression Estimates of Effects of Gender on Vote Share
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992;  n=1924)
Dependent Variable (1-4): (1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote Share
Female -.022** -.020* -.014 .020**
(n=108) (.011) (.009) (.009) (.008)
R .00 .17 .18 .72
2
Dependent Variable (5-8): (5) (6) (7) (8)
Square Root of Vote Share
Female -.012* -.010* -.006 .013***
(n=108) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.005)
R .00 .17 .18 .68
2
Party, Year and District controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tenure and Position controls No No Yes Yes
Challenger controls No No No Yes
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Vote share is calculated using only the top two
vote-getters;  all standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option in TSP).25
Table Five: Probit Estimates of Effects of Gender on Presence and Quality of Challengers
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992;  n=1924)
Dependent Variable (1-4): (1) (2) (3) (4)
Opposed in General Election
Female .671*** .623** .601** .601**
(n=108) (.251) (.263) (.275) (.275)
Percent Positive\Percent Predicted 90\90 90\90 90\90 90\90
Dependent Variable (5-8): (5) (6) (7) (8)
Major Party Opponent
Female .903*** .901*** .871*** .878***
(n=108) (.250) (.263) (.265) (.274)
Percent Positive\Percent Predicted 85\85 85\85 85\85 85\85
Dependent Variable (9-12): (9) (10) (11) (12)
High Quality Opponent
Female .332** .348** .274** .244*
(n=108) (.134) (.140) (.141) (.143)
Percent Positive\Percent Predicted 18\82 18\82 18\82 18\82
Party, Year and District controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tenure and Position controls No No Yes Yes
Incumbent Carry Over  and No No No Yes -1
Incumbent Vote Share  controls -1
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).26
Table Six:  Selection Corrected Regression Estimates of Effects of Gender
(All Incumbents Opposed by a High Quality Challenger, 1984-1992; n=340)
Incumbent Log(Incumbent  Incumbent Log(Incumbent
Receipts Receipts) Expenditures Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -31,658 -.048 -22,900 -.037
(n=29) (46,082) (.098) (66,487) (.105)
R .17 .19 .18 .18
2
Mean of the Dependent 641,039 13.23 644,656 13.22
Variable (Std. Dev.) (362,277) (.54) (391,112) (.59)
Incumbent Square Root of Challenger Log(Challenger
Vote Share Vote Share Expenditures Expenditures)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Female .061*** .038** -111,713** -.52*
(n=29) (.017) (.010) (53,198) (.297)
R .24 .30 .20 .21
2
Mean of the Dependent .61 .78 292,548 11.85
Variable (Std. Dev.) (.09) (.06) (306,744) (1.56)
Party, Year and District Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Tenure and Position Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Sample Selection Yes Yes Yes Yes
control
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Receipts and Expenditures are in real dollars
(1990=100);  all standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option in TSP).27
Table Seven:  More Selection Corrected Estimates of Effects of Gender
(All Incumbents Opposed by a Major Party Challenger, 1984-1992; n=1638)
Incumbent Log(Incumbent Incumbent Log(Incumbent 
Receipts Receipts) Expenditures Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -25,502 -039 -25,668 -.059
(n=105) (28,323) (.054) (24,744) (.067)
R .14 .18 .17 .21
2
Mean of the Dependent 501,364 12.95 473,040 12.84
Variable (Std. Dev.) (303,876) (.62) (327,905) (.72)
Incumbent Square Root of Challenger Log(Challenger
Vote Share Vote Share Expenditures Expenditures)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Female .054** .033*** -44,299* -.514***
(n=105) (.009) (.005) (23,939) (.194)
R .38 .36 .15 .20
2
Mean of the Dependent .663 .812 145,819 10.56
Variable (Std. Dev.) (.098) (.098) (231,022) (1.91)
Party, Year and District Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Tenure and Position Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Sample Selection control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *(p<.10), **(p<.05), and ***(p<.01).  Receipts and Expenditures are in real dollars
(1990=100);  vote share is calculated using the top two vote-getters.  All standard errors are
heteroscedastic consistent (using the “robust” option in TSP).
Table A1:  Descriptive Statistics28
(All Incumbents Running for Reelection, 1984-1992;  n=1924)
Continuous Mean Dichotomous
Variables (Std. Dev.) Variables Mean
Incumbent Receipts 474,768 Female .056
(1990 dollars) (295,817)
Incumbent Expenditures 439,430 Republican .394
(319,957)
Challenger Expenditures 124,350 Good Committee .307
(219,266)
Incumbent Vote Share .709 Leaders .127
(top two vote getters) (.144)
Tenure (years) 10.45 Freshman .138
(7.82)
Presidential Vote Share;  .07 Primary .295
Democrat, 1984 (.19)
Presidential Vote Share;  .06 1986 .201
Democrat, 1986 (.18)
Presidential Vote Share;  .06 1988 .208
Democrat, 1988 (.16)
Presidential Vote Share;  .06 1990 .207
Democrat, 1990 (.16)
Presidential Vote Share;  .05 1992 .176
Democrat, 1992 (.16)
Presidential Vote Share;  .05 1986*Republican .082
Republican, 1984 (.18)
Presidential Vote Share;  .05 1988*Republican .083
Republican, 1986 (.18)
Presidential Vote Share;  .05 1990*Republican .080
Republican, 1988 (.17)
Presidential Vote Share;  .05 1992*Republican .070
Republican, 1990 (.16)
Presidential Vote Share;  .04
Republican, 1992 (.16)TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
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